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This paper is showing that Serbia in the nineties was an interesting case of post-
socialist transformation in spite of the greatly blocked transition. The key sign of the 
post-socialist transformation has been the formation of a new transformative social 
force – formation of entrepreneurs and of the strata of social owners. Initial 
transformation of ownership relations in Serbia began in the 1990-1991. period, with 
limited privatization of some 40% of all former “socially owned” enterprises . 
Privatization of such firms was practically blocked in 1992-2000. period. Some 
comments  on ownership transformation after the regime change at the end of year 
2000 are given in the paper. 
  There was an autonomous growth of the private sector during the nineties 
generated by the formation of some 200.000 new private firms. It was shown in the 
paper that some branches, like retail trade, have been de facto privatized thanks to 
the predominance in trade business of new private retail trade firms. 
  Social features of new entrepreneurs in Serbia have been analyzed, based on 
author’ s surveys. Positive impact of new entrepreneurs has been not only in 
generating and enforcing systemic changes by the end of nineties, but also in 
preventing overall aggravation of living conditions of people in Serbia in this period. 
New entrepreneurs were spreading new life orientations, innovativeness, readiness to 
take responsibility for one’s life, especially among the young generations. The author 
believes that post-socialist transformation in the nineties facilitated regime change in 
the Fall of year 2000. 
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In the literature on transition and post-socialist transformation in the nineties 
Serbia (as well as FR Yugoslavia) has been scarcely mentioned and analyzed. Many 
other aspects of dramatic and disturbing developments in Serbia (interethnic wars, in 
particular) had attracted attention by various audiences, but not developments related 
to the post-socialist transformation of Serbian society in this period. Transition in this 
country was considered being blocked since 1990. Most social analysts think that 
transition in Serbia has begun to take place after the end of Milosevic’s rule at the end 
of the year 2000.  
The aim of this paper
1 is to put some additional light on the generally accepted 
assessment that transition has been blocked in Serbia in the nineties. It will be shown 
that, in spite of this blockade, there were some  institutionally and non-institutionally 
generated activities in favour of privatization which have contributed to the real post-
socialist transformation of the Serbian society in the nineties. Specifically, this paper 
will describe the process of “ownership transformation” of the former “self-managed 
organizations” at the beginning of nineties and pinpoint the activities in relation to 
privatization during the nineties.  
The key sign of the post-socialist transformation has been the formation of a 
new important transformative social force in Serbian society, namely, formation of 
entrepreneurs and of the strata of private owners. Based on the available survey data 
on social profile of entrepreneurs some features of these “new entrepreneurs” will be 
analysed and some comments about their impact on the  transformation of Serbian 
society in that period will be made. 
This author is convinced that, in spite of all tragic and destructive 
“developments” in Serbia in the nineties, Serbian society has entered the New 
Millennium as a considerably changed society, with many features similar to other 
post-socialist societies. Also, it seems sound to claim that such real social 
transformations, which were going contrary to the regime intentions to prevent 
transition, have made possible recent change of regime and the end of Milosevic’s 
rule in Serbia. 
 
  
                                                 
1 This paper has been prepared during my visit to the William Davidson Institute at the Business 
School of the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor and I express my thanks to the Institute for the 2 
On the “blocked transition” and limited privatization in Serbia in the 90’ 
 
Those who speak about  the “blocked transition” in Serbia mean in the first 
place that there has been no comprehensive privatization of the former state/ “social”/ 
firms. Yet, there has been an initial faze of “ownership transformation “ in Serbia, 
initiated by several federal laws enacted in the 1989-90 period (Zec, M., all 1994).The 
starting approach of the federal law-makers at that time was to make employees in 
former “self-management” organizations as individual “shareholders” in their firms, 
to motivate them for a more efficient use of capital and all resources at their disposal. 
According to the available data (Zec, M., all, 1994: 228) by the end of 1992 some 
33% of “social” enterprises completed the process of ownership transformation
2 and 
legally these organizations were functioning as “share-holding companies”. How 
ever, only part of the formerly “socially owned capital” went nominally in the hands 
of employees. State banks and other “social firms” had their shares in such 
companies, and sometime, some outsiders, private owners,  became shareholders. Part 
(1/3) of the assessed value of the formerly “socially owned means” has been 
transferred, by the law, to the Development fund, to be used for solving pressing 
social problems of unemployed, retired people and for some other social needs. In 
those “transformed” firms some 43% of total values of former “socially owned 
capital” legally existed now as “capital of shareholders”. 
  According to the available data, some additional 30% of all “social 
enterprises”
3 have started some activities directed toward their “ownership 
transformation” in the period 1990-1992. Even though there are no reliable data on 
subsequent  “transformative” activities in those non-transformed firms, from the data 
on firms pending for privatisation in the “post-October 2000” period, one could assess 
that in the second half of the nineties there has been no significant “ownership 
transformation” of former “self-managed” firms in Serbia. 
  Former “public companies”, controlled during the years of “self-management” 
more directly than other “social firms” by the state, (federal state, state of republic, 
city governments, or governments of specific municipalities), became (after 1989) 
                                                                                                                                            
Fellowship and professional support . Part of this material has been presented in a lecture in the Centre 
for Russian and East European Studies of the University of Michigan. 
2 Laws which were enacted during the rule of  “socialists” were not titled as “laws on privatization”, 
but as “laws on ownership transformation”.  The first law aimed at privatization to be named ‘law on 
privatization”  has been the 2001 Law, prepared and enacted after the regime change in October 2000. 3 
public companies in the state property. These were firms in important businesses in 
energy production and distribution, public transportation, utilities, media, health, 
education,. According to the available estimates (Zec, M., 1994: 241) some 44% of 
the assessed value of the formerly “socially owned capital” has become state property 
in this first faze of “ownership transformation”. 
           In  this  short  story  about  the  initial  attempts  in  privatization  in  Serbia  it  is 
necessary to stress that in summer 1994 Serbian parliament enacted a so-called “Law 
on revalorization” of the sold “socially owned means” in the 1990-1994 period , with 
the idea to prevent unjust property gains by shareholders because of the effects of the 
inflation in this period, especially of the hyperinflation in the 1992-1994 period. This 
measure of retroactive valuation of already transferred capital in the hands of 
individual shareholders resulted in de facto return of the “privatized” capital in the  
“socially owned capital”. According to the available estimates (Zec, M., Zivkovic, B., 
1997: 83) 97% of the “privatized” capital has been renamed as “socially owned”, and 
only 3% remained in the hands of shareholders.   
  In the second half of the nineties, specifically in 1997, a new Law on 
ownership transformation has been enacted by the Serbian parliament, with the idea to 
increase some incentives (in the form of free shares) to employees in still non-
transformed firms to start privatization. There were also more strict deadlines 
determined by the Law to end the process of “transformation”. By the end of year 
2000, only minor number of firms started transformation in shareholding companies 
in accordance with this 1997 Law. But, some 400 “social firms” went in a speedy 
“ownership transformation” in the first half of the year 2001, when a new Law on 
privatization was in preparation. The new “law on privatization” in preparation 
greatly was supposed to reduce the rights of employees on free shares provisioned by 
the former laws and to reduce the role of employees’ collectives in the privatization 
process, and this seem to explain the speeded “ownership transformation” at the 
beginning of the year 2001. 
The new government of Serbia enacted a new Law on privatization in summer 
2001. Privatization became obligatory and should be completed during the period of 
four years after the Law has been enacted. State Agency for privatization has been 
directly preparing some 150 firms to be sold by tenders and some 7000 firms to be 
                                                                                                                                            
3 According to the Law on Enterprises, enacted in 1989, former “self-managed organizations” were 
legally renamed as “social enterprises” if their assets were still “socially owned”. 4 
sold on the auctions. By the end of 2001 three of 150 firms planned for tenders were 
sold, and 22 auctions were successful. During the year 2002 some additional 10 firms 
have been privatized by tenders and several hundreds of “social firms” have been 
successfully privatized through auctions
4. The process of privatization is still slow, for 
many reasons which could not be analysed properly in this paper
5. So, one could say 
that the real process of the institutionally provided privatization of the former “social 
firms” in Serbia has not gone to far, in spite of described steps during this period to 
provide new “ownership arrangements” and new system of governance in Serbian 
enterprises. Still, some important social transformations were under way. 
 
On the post-socialist transformation of Serbia in the nineties 
 
In Serbia during the nineties its social structure, especially the political elite 
stratum, remained basically closed (Sekelj, L. 1998, 613). The rule of law was greatly 
a "lips service" of the rulers. Political pluralism became a nominal but not a real 
framework of the Serbian political life (Goati,V.,ed.1995), since de facto political 
power was not in the parliament but in the hands of the President of Serbia (S. 
Milosevic) and his most loyal collaborators. Permanent ideological requests for the 
"country's unity" and the "priority of national interests" served well as a legitimisation 
formula of a non-democratic, totalitarian rule of the  Serbian regime in the nineties, 
and for the suppression of the civil society in this country. Under such societal 
conditions in Serbia the post-socialist transformation and the spread of 
entrepreneurship should have been impossible. Was this the case?   
 In spite of many anti-transitional trends, there has been a gradually increasing 
share of the private sector in the formation of social product of Serbia (see table 1.). 
This was in part a result of limited privatisation of smaller former "socially owned 
firms" at the beginning of nineties even if many of the “transformed” former socially 
owned firms had in fact mixed state and social ownership and private ownership. 
Increased share of the private sector in the social product formation was, in part, the 
outcome of the rapid formation and growth of new (albeit small) private firms 
established primarily by individual domestic founders. Finally, this share of the 
                                                 
4 These are information given on the web site of the Serbian Ministry for privatization. 
5 There are some current circumstances, like  the great political instability in Serbia, preventing more 
comprehensive privatization, and also some processes of longer duration, like the overall destruction of 
society which is generating slow process of reconstruction of the basic societal institutions, including 5 
private sector was a consequence of the private ownership in agriculture, handicraft 
and services, which existed in the pre-transition period. 
 
Table 1.  Social  and  private  sector's  social  product  (GDP)*,       
Yugoslavia**, 1989 - 1999                    
 1989  1991  1995  1999*** 
  Total social product (GDP)  49.811  33.807   14.155  20.045 
  Private sector product (GDP)    5.416    6.729     7.862   8.448 
% of private social product         11         20         55        42 
Indices of change (1989=100)         
Total social product         100         68         28        40 
Social product -  Private Sector        100       124       145 
160 
 
 _____________________ ______________________________________________ 
Source: SGJ-1998:124; SGJ-2001: 91. * The numbers are millions of Yugoslav Dinars, in 
the 1994 "constant prices". **Available data for Yugoslavia depict  also trends for Serbia 
since Serbian GDP is about 95% of the Yugoslav GDP.*** Without data for Kosovo.   
The share of the private sector's economy in Serbia is somewhat smaller when 
assessed by the share of the private sector's employment in the total employment (see 
table 2.). It is evident that during the nineties the employment in the social sector 
declined at the much lower rate than was declining the social product of the social 
sector in that period. At the same time the social product of the private sector grew 
faster than was increasing employment in that sector. These trends reflect two 
different business (and social) orientations of employers in these sectors. The "state 
rulers" as “employers” hesitated to fire extensively employees from social and state 
firms, which were in reality collapsing.  There was a fear of uncontrollable social 
unrests. In stead of firing employees, "state employers" subsidised social firms, in part 
through the virtually raised state incomes via hyperinflation. Salaries of those 
employed in social and state firms have been drastically reduced in their real 
purchasing power. Also, wages were paid very irregularly. During the 1991-1994 
period around 40% of employees in the social sector have been sent (from several 
                                                                                                                                            
those regulating economic life of this country (more on the “destruction of society” of Serbia in the 6 
months to more than one year) on extended and "forced leaves" (Bolcic, S. 1995: 82), 
with minimal or even no payments. State  tolerated "generously" all forms of work in 
“hidden” economy
6, and provided, often through the unions, some "payments in kind" 
(in food and other "necessities") to pacify employees, especially those in larger 
industrial organisations.  Constant nourishing of nationalist sentiments of people 
served as a good "antidote" for the expressed and suppressed dissatisfactions of 
Serbian populations, whose negative energy was mobilised against "enemies" (foreign 
and domestic) instead against "rulers" which were de facto destroying the fundaments 
of a civilised life in Serbia. 
 
Table 2.  Trends in total employment and employment in the private  
                         sector:   Yugoslavia 1989 – 1999 
 
  1989 1991 1995 1999* 
Total  employment (in 000)  2791  2625  2379  2238 
Employment in social sector  2733           2438  2114  1710 
Employment in private sector      58   187              265     322 
% Of total employment in the 
private sector 
      2        7       11      14 
Indices (1989= 100)         
Social Sector     100       89        77        63 
Private Sector     100      332      457      555 
 ___________________________________________________________________ 
 Source: SGJ-1998: 96; SGJ-2001: 132. * Without data for Kosovo. 
 
Private employers hesitated to hire as much employees as a normal 
organisation of their business would have required, because of fears for their 
tomorrow's business situation in the collapsing Serbian economy. Of course, cheap, 
unofficially engaged labour in the “grey” labour market provided considerable 
untaxed profits for many owners of private firms.  The tacit coalition of the "ruling 
                                                                                                                                            
nineties see, Bolcic, S., 1994 ).  
6 See, Bolcic, S., 1995: 86-90: also, on hidden economy in Yugoslavia, see, G. Bozovic, 1992. 7 
circle" and some of new entrepreneurs contributed to such mal-developments of the 
rapidly vanishing social sector and insufficient growth of the private sector. 
What pressingly ask for explanation are the reasons for such a mal-
development of Serbia in the nineties. Some analysts suggest causes of longer 
duration, like the missing democratic traditions in Serbia and the prevailing 
authoritarian value orientations of majority of Serbs (Golubovic, Z., all, 1995), where 
rulers tended to be dictators with a large popular support (Podunavac, M. 1998, 30-
36). This could explain also the practically uncontested Milosevic's populist rule in 
the nineties.  
It seems also as a very pertinent the explanation of the Serbian  case of the 
interrupted post-socialist transformations by the multi-ethnic composition and 
suppressed ethnic conflicts in the former "socialist" Yugoslavia, and by the 
subsequent  revival of ethno-nationalism as a mobilising force used by former and 
new political elite to preserve or to enforce their dominant social position (Sekelj, L., 
1995). By nationalistic state policies masses were effectively controlled and pacified, 
in spite of their great discontent caused by the unwise state policies of the "socialist-
nationalist" rulers. But, one should separate the role of the objective multi-ethnicity 
and of normal inter-ethnic tensions, which existed in all periods of the multi-ethnic 
state of Yugoslavia, from the destructive role of ethno-nationalistic mobilisations of 
people in Serbia, as well in other post-Yugoslav societies in the nineties (Bolcic, S., 
1995a). 
Here one must understand the conditions under which this "ethno-nationalistic 
counter-revolution", lead by the former "socialist" rulers, became possible, in Serbia 
in particular. First, it might be relevant to analyse the power system in the former 
Yugoslavia, not only the distribution of social power, but also the sources of power of 
various social groups, especially the role of the military elite
7 and the established 
"power culture" (Bolcic, S., 1997a). Such analysis would show that the strength and 
the legitimacy of former rulers in Yugoslavia, and in Serbia likewise, have been less 
eroded at the end of eighties than in other former "socialist" countries. Therefore, 
their persuasive (and manipulative) power was greater than in other countries. 
Secondly, the "self-management ownership arrangements", in spite of all evident 
discrepancies between the "project" and the reality of self-management, generated 
                                                 
7 According to the available survey data (Slavujevic. Z. , 1997: 67) the army as institution was the most 
trusted of all institutions of state in Serbia, even after its “debacles” in the “Yugoslav” wars since 1991.  8 
greater employees identification with their normative role of "co-owner" and that lead 
to the greater inclinations of majority of employees toward some forms of "employee 
ownership" as a form of privatisation an not to the "voucher" type of privatisation of 
former state firms practised in some other post-socialist countries
8. 
Under such societal conditions a peculiar "vicious circle" of the blocked 
transition in Serbia was established (Bolcic, S. 1997) where the existing power system 
prevented immediate full-scale privatisation of the state/social property, while the 
prolonged life of the "social/state property" reinforced the existing power system. 
The breaking of this "vicious circle" was slow, socially painful.  One of the 
contributing forces in the deblocking of transition in Serbia seems to have been the 
new entrepreneurs, especially those thousands of small entrepreneurs in all parts of 
nowadays Serbia. 
 
  The Spread of Entrepreneurship in Serbia in the Nineties 
 
Social abnormalities have become a distinguishing feature of Serbia at the end 
of eighties and in the nineties. In such a social context it come as a surprise the 
continuing spread of the private entrepreneurship, the enlargement of the social strata 
of private entrepreneurs, and the increased entrepreneurial inclinations among all 
segments of the nowadays Serbian society. 
Objective indication of this spread of entrepreneurship are given in the table 
3., on numbers and proportions of private enterprises in the nineties. 
 
Table 3.   Private Enterprises in Serbia, 1990- 1997. 
 
 1990  1991  1997  2000 
No. of private enterprises  21.567  44.780  178.432  167.555 
% of all firms being private   77  81  91         80 
Index (1990= 100)  100  208  827       777 
 ____________________________________________________________________ 
 Sources: Zec, all, 1994; SGJ-95; SGJ-98 
                                                 
8 In a survey study done in 1992. the  orientation toward “workers' ownership” was more frequent (33%) than 
toward the "sale" of "social "/state  capital (29%), see, Vukovic, S., 1996; the same orientations has been registered 
in Slovenia, see, Kanjuo-Mrcela, A., 1994.: 109). 9 
 
Since private enterprises have not existed before 1989 and official statistics 
started to publish data on them in 1990, indications presented in the table 3.  depict 
the "great leap forward" in respect of the spread of entrepreneurship in Serbia during 
the nineties. The number of these private enterprises at the end of nineties has been 
some eighth times bigger than at the beginning of nineties
9. 
Of all private firms 80% were (and still are ) very small, with less than 5 
employees (Popovic, P., 1995, 53).  Therefore, this 9/10 of all firms being private 
provided employment for some 14%of the total employment in Serbia in the year 
2000. But, if we add individuals engaged in private farming (and they were not 
registered as "employed" persons in statistical sources), and self-employed individuals 
in private handicraft shops and also all those unregistered individuals in "informal 
enterprises" dealing in the sector of the hidden economy, the share of the active 
population of Serbia that directly depends on the private enterprising may be 
estimated to be up to 1/3 of the total active population. This has been an expanding 
segment of the Serbian society in the nineties
10 whose over-all social impact was even 
greater than is reflected in the presented quantitative measure of its importance. The 
new owners and entrepreneurs were establishing new life orientation and new rules 
for the rest of society. 
The expansiveness and the social impact of entrepreneurs comes in part from 
their basic societal role of the promoters of innovations in business life, as the "risk-
takers" who are ready to act according to their own judgements, often away, even 
against conventional routes. It seems that the existing increasing destructuration 
("destruction"
11) of the Serbian society, with a lot of disorganisation, has not 
discouraged most of small entrepreneurs to continue to do private business, even if 
that assumed frequent changes of their specific field of business.  
 
 
 
                                                 
9 The variations in indices for various years might be describing the reality, but also could be in part 
due to the unreliable statistical data, and the fact that, especially at the beginning of nineties, there were 
many registered firms not being active in the business life in Serbia. 
10 Between 1950 and 1990. percent of employed persons in the private "shops" was stagnant (around 2%). During 
the nineties the number self-employed individuals grew up to 190.000 (D.Minjevic, 1999) 
11 I suggested to describe the social situation of Serbia in the nineties as a "destruction of the society", not just the 
destruction of the former state of Yugoslavia. On the features of such a destruction of the fundamentals of the 
society see, Bolcic, S. 1994, 141-147. 10 
 
Main Features of New Entrepreneurs 
 
  There are controversies about features and future role of  the rapidly growing 
social group of  new entrepreneurs in Serbia, as in other countries in transition. Many 
social actors (political parties and other groups) in the public arena are “lobbing” now 
strongly for entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs are being pictured as promoters of a truly 
modern and efficient business which should restore a sound and modern market 
economy in these former socialist societies.   On the other side of the public scene are 
commentators of recent social changes in Serbia who are  blaming new entrepreneurs 
for the spread of  undesired consequences of recent transitory changes (like, the 
revival of many aspects of the “primary accumulation” of capital, of the proliferation 
of various forms of illegal, “Mafia” business practices, etc.). These conflicting 
assessments  seem to work  against the strengthening of the  positive attitude of the 
general public in Serbia toward entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship and also may 
affect state measures aimed at the societal regulation of entrepreneurship. 
  Part of these controversies  result from the discrepancy of the real features of 
new entrepreneurs and their expected characteristics. So, it was expected that 
entrepreneurs in these societies in transition should be mostly new people which 
would come outside of the former nomenclature, outside of circles of former socialist 
managers, even outside of circles of employed persons in the former social/state 
sector. They were expected to be individuals with considerable work experience in 
private business, those who worked in entrepreneurial firms in Western capitalist 
countries, individuals with considerable family traditions in private business, and also 
persons with appropriate knowledge ("know-how") needed in the modern business. 
Do new entrepreneurs in Serbia meet these expectations, or who are they, in fact? 
  According to the available 1992. survey data
12 one could say that 59% of new 
private entrepreneurs  were employed in "social firms" before they become private 
entrepreneurs; some 2% of them were previously employed in foreign firms in 
Yugoslavia and 6% of them were employed abroad; 4% were self-employed or 
employed in other private firms; 25% of them were unemployed persons. So, in 85% 
                                                 
12The 1992 survey provided data on 373 private entrepreneurs (owners, owners with managerial role 
and managers of various private firms); see details on methodology in the "Methodological Note" at the 
end of this paper and in Bolcic, 1995b. Unfortunately, there are no comparable data for recent years, 11 
of cases new entrepreneurs in Serbia have come either from the circle of employees in 
"social firms" or from the circle of unemployed persons. 
  New entrepreneurs in Serbia are individuals  of various basic occupations and 
work roles (in an open question respondents have mentioned some 50 different work 
roles that they had before becoming private entrepreneurs). Very frequently (in 36% 
of cases) they were  in some leading (managerial) positions in organizations (heads of 
divisions, departments, sectors, including general managers.). Relatively frequently 
(in 14% of cases) they were personnel of financial, commercial and similar divisions 
of social firms; in 11% of cases they were in professional's jobs. Some 16% of them 
were in positions of ordinary workers, but most of these workers were workers in 
trade and services. 
  This frequent take-over of the entrepreneurial positions by the former socialist 
managers, observed also in other societies in transitions (Lengyel, G., all, eds., 1992), 
is even more evident in somewhat bigger private firms, those of 30 employed persons 
and more. In this case 47% of private entrepreneurs were in managerial positions 
(Lazic, M., 1994). These individuals   have had  access to various social networks 
which seem to be very relevant for their business activities (see, Lengeyl, G., all, 
eds.,1992: 135). 
  When considering the prevailing age of new entrepreneurs one could assume 
that their younger age had been probably of the greatest importance for their decision 
to become entrepreneurs and also for their frequent success in the new occupational 
role since they were individuals with   great ability to learn "new things". According 
to our 1992 survey data, 47% of surveyed entrepreneurs were younger persons (of less 
than 35 years of age) and only 15% of them were older than 45 years of age. The data 
from 1994. and 1999 survey  confirm this finding and allow the comparison of the age 
structure of owners of firms, other employees of private firms and employees of 
"social firms". As could be seen from the Table 4, both private entrepreneurs and 
employees of private firms in nowadays Serbia are younger than employees in "social 
firms". One may assume that these younger employees in private firms came either 
from the circle of those previously unemployed and also from the circle of employees 
in "social firms". 
 
                                                                                                                                            
except for some of characteristics of  “private owners”, provided in recent surveys of this author. 
Official statistics in Serbia is not providing data on characteristics of entrepreneurs.    12 
 
 
Table 4.   The age characteristics of various social segments  in Serbia,  
                        1994-1999 
Age group  Owners of 
firms 
 
Employees in 
private firms 
 
Employees in 
social firms 
 
All 
respondents* 
21-30      1994 
                1999 
19.6  
37.8 
41.0        
36.8 
11.5       
17.2 
22.3  
27.0 
31-40      1994 
                1999 
39.1  
15.6 
19.7    
25.4 
25.6     
25.9 
15.1  
16.3 
41-50      1994 
                1999 
30.4  
31.1 
26.2    
21.9 
39.0    
37.4 
25.2  
21.0 
51 +         1994 
                1999 
10.9  
26,7 
9.8    
11.4 
22.6   
19.0 
37.4  
30.3 
Total:        %  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Number    1994 
                 1999 
 46   
45 
 61    
114 
 305     
348 
766  
1128 
* In the 1994 survey respondents were from the “Belgrade region”, including 
municipalities outside Belgrade City limits. In spite of some differences, in 
“structural” sense, these data are comparable to the 1999 survey data for Serbia 
(without Kosovo).  
  It is clear that even if there are differences between the first and second half of 
the nineties in age characteristics of the compared social segments, the basic trend of 
having younger people in private firms and older people in “social”  firms has not 
changed during this decade. In the 1999 there were more younger owners of private 
firms of the age 21- 30, who must have entered in the “entrepreneurial circle” in the 
second half of nineties. Also, there were more private owners in the age group of 50 
years and more. These “older” entrepreneurs should be those who were younger (41-
50) at the beginning of nineties and who have succeeded to “survive” as entrepreneurs 
in those turbulent years of the nineties in Serbia. 
  The movements of the work force from the "social" to private firms in the 
nineties in  Serbia meant not only a "draining" of younger employees but also an 
overall "draining" of skilful persons from "social firms". These skilful people who 13 
have left "social firms" and got employment in private firms in many cases were not 
individuals with greater formal education, as it is documented in table  on education 
of owners of firms in 1994 and 1999. 
 
Table 5. Education of owners of private firms: Serbia, 1994- 1999 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
            Less than       Secondary     Higher     University        All respondents 
              second. school    school           education                            %      number 
    
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Beograde,1994       18     66    7     9                   100      44 
 
Serbia,     1999          7               69                13            11                        100     45         
Source: Surveys of the Institute for Sociological Research, Faculty of Philosophy, 
Beograd              
 The prevalence of individuals with secondary education  among entrepreneurs 
and owners of private enterprises is evident. On the other hand, a sub-sample of 
private entrepreneurs running firms of 30  employees and over (Lazic, M., 1994: 157) 
had 28% of those with secondary school, 28% with "higher" education and 44% were 
persons with university education. In spite of these variations in the proportion of 
private entrepreneurs with secondary level education in these surveyed samples, it 
seems clear  that, at the first stage of transition, new entrepreneurs in Serbia have had 
rarely university level education. In that respect, managers of "social firms" are still 
better educated  than private entrepreneurs (according to Lazic findings, 1994, 89% of 
managers of "social" firms have had university education).  
From our 1994 survey in Belgrade region one could say that from the point of 
the formal education the "quality" of the average personnel in "social firms" is still 
somewhat better than the one in private firms: while "social firms" have some 18% of 
those with university education, in private firms there were 11% of employees with 
this highest education. 
  This peculiar educational profile of new entrepreneurs in Serbia deserves some 
comments. As first, this prevalence of entrepreneurs with secondary level education 
seems to be related to the prevalence of very small private firms that are being 14 
established in the nineties. According to our 1992 survey, 60% of firms had no more 
than 5 employed persons and only 5% of them had 30 employed persons and more
13. 
  These new private firms were organizations of the most "simplest form" 
(Mintzberg, H., 1983), and it seems normal that their entrepreneurs (owners and 
managers) do not need the highest, university education. This is even more natural 
when we take into account the prevailing activities of these private firms. In the 1992. 
survey, 45% of surveyed firms were in trade, 20% in traditional (personal, artisan's) 
services and in the restaurant business, 21% in other, modern services, like health, 
recreational, professional, financial and similar services. Only 14% of these firms 
were active in industrial production, construction and productive handicraft. Similar 
profile of business activities of private firms could be documented with official 
statistical data (see, SGJ, 2001: 54), and also from our  survey in Belgrade region, in 
April 1994. One could assume that the actual technology of trading in such small 
firms requires knowledge and skills provided sufficiently by secondary schools. Also, 
persons with such education seem to find more easily their "trade-offs" (what they 
gain and what they lose) when changing their former occupation than persons with 
university level education. But, individuals with university level education were more 
often found in modern services, especially in professional (intellectual) services. 
  The described educational profile of new entrepreneurs seems to be related to 
their style of business (for example, their strategy of doing any business which seems 
to be profitable even in the shortest run) and also to their “social activities” (like, 
frequent participation in various celebrations, shows, where they were showing their 
"richness"). But,  this "style" of life of “new entrepreneurs” would have to be more 
thoroughly studied. One could say that this prevailing secondary level education of 
new entrepreneurs was affecting also actual public perceptions and the assessments of 
this new economic elite. Sudden social promotion of new entrepreneurs to the elite 
position was not readily accepted as legitimate by ordinary people. Their success 
could hardly be explained by their greater knowledge, talents, innovative capacities. 
The surveyed actual entrepreneurs in our 1992. survey study have related the success 
in business in 28% to their knowledge, in 17% to good connections with "powerfuls” 
in the government. In 14% of replies they mentioned speedy reactions to market 
demands, in 13% they were stressing originality of their ideas, in 8% they mentioned 
                                                 
13 According to the official statistical data for year 2000 (SGJ 2001:54) private enterprises had in 
average 4 employees.  15 
hard work of their employees, 4% have mentioned luck, some 6% pointed the 
relevance of the branch in which one is doing business or state regulations, and 3% 
gave other replies.
14 
  Entrepreneur's knowledge was, evidently, the most frequently pointed quality 
of successful businessmen (entrepreneurs) in nowadays Serbia.  It is interesting, 
however, that both potential (in 1991 survey) and actual entrepreneurs (in 1992 
survey) were stressing good connections with "powerfuls in government" as the 
second most important circumstance for the success of  entrepreneurs. 
  It is important to note that new entrepreneurs in Serbia are newcomers from 
the point of their family background and in relation to the entrepreneurial experiences 
in their families. In the 1992 survey the occupation of parents of our entrepreneurs 
was as follows: peasants (14%); private artisans (7%); unqualified and semi-qualified 
workers (24%); qualified and highly qualified workers (5%); workers in services 
(9%); clerks (7%); "technicians" (with secondary level education) (2%); professionals 
(14%); military persons (4%), other occupations (10%). We could assume that some 
of those professionals were also in managerial position even though respondents had 
not given this answers in an open question. 
  In comparison with the active population in Serbia, which is still at least for 
one third in peasant occupations, our new entrepreneurs are much less of the peasant 
family background and also quite rarely are they offspring of private artisans. They 
come evidently more often from families of non-agricultural "working people" of 
various occupations and education. This picture of social mobility of new 
entrepreneurs is somewhat different for the sub-sample of bigger entrepreneurs 
(Lazic, M., 1994: 157), whose fathers were  considerably  more often, or still are,  
managers. 
  It is relevant also to consider the existence of some family tradition in 
entrepreneurship as contributing moment for the formation of new entrepreneurs. In 
our 1992 survey study respondents were asked: "Was there or is it someone in your 
family or of yours closest relatives in the private business". Their replies were as 
follows: 
    - was and it is now in private business (21%) 
    - was but it is not now in private business (12%) 
                                                 
14Respondents could select and rank two "conditions" of success. Here are given data of the condition 
selected as the first one. 16 
    - was not before, but it is now in private business    (11%) 
    - was not and it is not now in private business (56%). 
  So, it is evident that the majority of our new entrepreneurs in Serbia are 
"newcomers", without previous family inclination to entrepreneurship. Still, there was 
a third of them with the "family surrounding" that could have fostered their 
entrepreneurial inclination and one could  expect some positive transfer of 
entrepreneurial experiences and skills to new entrepreneurs. In the 1994 survey in 
Belgrade region respondents were asked whether their partners or grandparents were 
entrepreneurs. Only 17% of them said "yes", but owners of firms said "yes" in 33% of 
cases, a result that is like the one in our 1992 survey.
15 
  Previous characterization of new entrepreneurs in Serbia has pointed out their 
socio-demographic features. In the most classical and contemporary descriptions of 
entrepreneurs various social and psychological traits of entrepreneurs are highlighted. 
Their activity and their successfulness are related to certain social circumstances (like, 
the openness of social structure, characteristics of the system of social promotion, 
ownership relations, stability of legal rules, mode of the regulation of the economy, 
dominant cultural orientations,
16 etc.), or to  their personal traits (self-confidence, 
readiness to take risky decisions, etc.). One of characteristics of the every-day life of 
entrepreneurs, their frequent communications with different individuals, their 
intensive social life, their participation in many gatherings were not mentioned to 
often. This feature of "new entrepreneurs" is now being more often mentioned and 
studied (see, Sociological Abstracts, Supl., 173, Bielefeld, 1994.,p.153,290,304) 
Evidently, this intensive social life of entrepreneurs seems to be important for their 
entrepreneurial activities. From others they are getting relevant information's and 
quite often the initial support for their intended business activities. 
  This assumption on the greater sociability of entrepreneurs as one of their 
relevant features could be, at least tentatively, supported by our survey data. In the 
1992 survey study respondents were asked: "How many good acquaintances with 
whom you have frequent contacts do you have?" Two thirds of surveyed 
entrepreneurs were included in "larger circles" (of 20 persons and more) and even 
43% of them were encircled in circles of 40 person and more. In comparison, the 
                                                 
15 Almost the same results came from our 1999 survey: see, Bolcic, S., 2002: 116. 
16 More on these general prerequisites of entrepreneurship see, Bolcic, S., 1992. 17 
potential entrepreneurs (in 1991 survey) were encircled only in 11% of cases in these 
large circles of 40 persons and more. 
  In the 1994 survey study respondents were asked: "How many friends do you 
have?" Their answers are reported in the Table 6. Variations in the size of the circles 
of friends are not great, but, it is evident that owners of firms do have greater number 
of friends, and this could be an indication of their participation in other larger social 
circles. 
 
Table 6.   The size of circles of friends for various categories of Belgrade 
population, 1994. 
  How many friends do you have? 
Category None  1-5  6-10  11-20  21+  Other  All  respondents 
%      number 
All  respondents  2.9 25.3 23.7 15.3 15.9 16.9  100.0  767 
Employees in social 
firms 
 
1.3 
 
23.2 
 
22.9 
 
15.7 
 
18.0 
 
19.0 
 
100.0 
 
306 
Employees in 
private firms 
 
3.3 
 
16.4 
 
32.8 
 
13.1 
 
19.7 
 
14.7 
 
100.0 
 
61 
Owners  of  firm  0.0 15.2 21.7 23.7 28.3 10.9  100.0  46 
 
  Of course, new and methodologicaly more appropriate studies of the role of 
"networking" of entrepreneurs are needed for the assessment of this aspect of their 
activity and of their successfulness. 
  One would also need a more in-depth study of personality of these new 
entrepreneurs. After all, entrepreneurs are in many respects "peculiar persons" 
(DeBono, E., 1986) and every entrepreneur seem to have some peculiar personal 
"story" (or "secret")  about his/her entering in the "world of entrepreneurship" and 
about his/her path to the success in business (DeBono, 1986, Zolak, T & V, eds., 
1991). From our survey studies only some tentative observations on these personality 
traits of new entrepreneurs in Serbia are possible. When our entrepreneurs in the 1992 
survey were asked to select a personal trait which they would consider to be the most 
important for them being businessmen, they have described themselves as: a hard-
working person (24%); a determined person (21%); a self-confident person (10%); a 
creative person (8%); a person capable to find its own way (7.5%); a person devoted 18 
to some idea (6%); a person ready to accept risk (5%); a person being easy in 
contacting others (5%); a person with "good nerves" (3.5%); an optimistic person 
(3%). 
  It was no surprise to get such a variety of descriptions of personal traits of new 
entrepreneurs. From the textbook notions on entrepreneurs one might have expected 
greater stress on creativity ("innovativeness") and on the acceptance of risks. One 
might say, however, that under the actual very unstable social conditions in Serbia, 
those new entrepreneurs seem to have accepted risks more than it is expressed by 
these survey data. Also, there must have been some peculiar creativity 
(innovativeness) in their every day activities to maintain the actual level of normalcy 
in economic life in Serbia, under the chaotic social conditions caused by the decay of 
the former state of Yugoslavia, by the ongoing "internal war" in the "Yugoslav area" 
and by the UN sanctions against the "new Yugoslavia". But, according to their direct 
answers,  some other personal features seem to be of greater importance: hard work, 
determination, self-confidence. This great stress on the hard work might reflect the 
yesterday's socialist or traditional "work ethics", but it could also be a hidden way of 
legitimization of the quick and immense economic success of many new 
entrepreneurs who have become rich under the conditions of the extreme economic 
downfall of Serbia in the last several years. Media stories and personal experiences 
about some of the richest and often controversial new entrepreneurs have certainly 
contributed to the widespread public perceptions of new entrepreneurs as main 
beneficiaries of this “transition from socialism”, even though many of small new 
entrepreneurs  had similar existential problems as other citizens of Serbia.  
If we know that the majority (some 70%) of entrepreneurs were  persons in 
younger and middle age (up to 50 years) and that even 50% of them were under 40 
years of age, than this social expansiveness of entrepreneurs is even more 
understandable.  
The limiting factors of the greater societal role of entrepreneurs, besides of 
those factors related to the over-all social situation in Serbia in the nineties, seem to 
be their over-concentration in the retail business (some 70% of private firms were in 
retail  trade and wholesale trade and services). Also, entrepreneurs have, as stated, 
relatively inferior education (some 70% of them had no more than secondary level 
education). The relatively inferior education of most entrepreneurs makes them less 
professionally competent in finding proper business solutions, even in demanding and 19 
providing the needed professional advice from those already employed in their firms 
as professionals or from independent professionals. De-professionalization seem also 
to be  relatively frequent case. Around 1/3 of persons in entrepreneurial roles in 
private firms worked out of their professions, according to a survey of A.Vojin, 
(1995).  In times when successes in the business in nowadays world heavily depend 
on the advantages in the "know-how", on professional capacities, such undereducated 
entrepreneurs must have been in serious disadvantage, especially when dealing with 
foreign entrepreneurs, and also in communications with their often  better educated 
employees. 
It is often claimed that power-holders in post-socialist societies succeeded to 
establish a new "ruling coalition" (in stead of the former coalition of the politocracy 
and workers) with new entrepreneurs, especially those controlling the larger and 
strategic companies. This seem to result from the fact that many of new entrepreneurs 
were part of the former "nomenclature cadres", in person or by their family's ties 
(Mateju P.1995.) This observation is pertinent also for Serbian entrepreneurs in the 
nineties, but mainly for those "bigger" entrepreneurs (Lazic, 1996), not for thousands 
of smaller entrepreneurs (Bolcic, 1994:107) Namely, the social origin of small 
entrepreneurs was, as mentioned, quite heterogeneous. Many of them were workers, 
particularly in trade, and also a significant proportion of entrepreneurs were 
unemployed persons of various basic occupations. Therefore, important segments of 
entrepreneurs should have been socially closer to the deprived strata of the society, 
than to those in power. But, their heterogeneity seems to be one of reasons of the 
weak association of among entrepreneurs and their inferior role as social actor of 
transformation of Serbia in the nineties.  
 
                 Increasing entrepreneurial inclinations 
 
Among the new forces generating important changes were not only new 
entrepreneurs, but also potential entrepreneurs, individuals from different social strata 
and occupations with entrepreneurial inclination., Their number in the nineties has 
also been somewhat greater at the end of nineties than  at the beginnings of the 
nineties. 
Relatively frequent entrepreneurial inclinations in the population of a given 
country seem to be a good socio-psychological indication of the readiness of a given 20 
society to evolve toward an entrepreneurial society
17. By virtue of having 
entrepreneurial inclinations, these people are likely to be supporters of entrepreneurial 
behaviour in others in a given society. 
There are survey data (Table 7) on the increasing entrepreneurial inclinations 
in the Serbian population in the nineties. 
 
Table 7.  Entrepreneurial Inclinations of the Serbian population, 1991-1999. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
    Would you like to be a private entrepreneur? *   
  .   
 Yes 
It  
depends 
No % 
Number of 
respondents 
Serbia  (1991)  20  41 39 100  1015 
Belgrade  (1994)**  17  33 50 100  800 
Serbia  (1998)  25  25 50 100  1247 
Serbia (1999)            22  38  40  100  1123 
 ____________________________________________________________________ 
Sources: Surveys of 1991, 1994,1999,by the Institute of Sociology, Faculty of Philosophy, 
and 1998. survey by the Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade. *This was not the exact 
wording of the question of the 1991 Survey, but in substantive way this was the meaning; 
see for details, Bolcic, S., 1997: 10-11.  ** Data for Belgrade were for the whole Belgrade 
region and could be considered as a good approximation for Serbia. 
The proportion of respondents with "determined" entrepreneurial inclination 
("yes" answer) in 1994. was somewhat lower than in 1991. That might have reflected 
some discouraging experiences of  entrepreneurs during the 1991-1993 period. That 
was a period of "hyper-hyper inflation", of tragic wars in the Yugoslav region, 
therefore period of very risky business for most of entrepreneurs. Decreasing 
entrepreneurial inclinations after the first enthusiasm were found in some other 
countries, like Hungary (Lengyel, 1994), too. 
 The increased proportion of "determined" potential entrepreneurs ( those who 
said “yes” , they would like to entrepreneurs”) in Serbia in 1998. when considering  
                                                 
17 An elaborated concept of a modern "entrepreneurial society" is given in Bolcic, S.,1995b. 21 
all unfavourable circumstances for the private business in Serbia, corroborated  the 
thesis of a spread of entrepreneurship in this country in spite of the blocked transition. 
Having experienced very difficult situation in the first half of the 1999, with and after 
NATO bombing, is was normal that in the Fall of 1999, when the survey was carried 
out, there would a slight decrease of “determined” potential entrepreneurs. Of course, 
because of the decreasing chances for employment at the end of nineties (some 40% 
of labour force was de facto unemployed in first half of 1999.) inclinations toward 
some form of self-employment, including in the form of private entrepreneurship, 
were realistic, not necessarily most desired, orientations of many individuals in 
Serbia. But, one needs to have a specific self-confidence and "drive" to select such a 
path in life, especially in a society where entrepreneurship in business has not been 
particularly socially supported, and not only in the years of the "socialist 
construction", but also in previous periods of the Serbian modernisation (see, Kostic, 
M., 1994). 
Entrepreneurial inclinations in Serbia, as in other post-socialist countries, were 
most frequent among young generation (up to 30 years of age) and among better-
educated segments of society (of secondary and higher level of education). This 
should mean that the most valuable segments of the actual and potential labour force 
are open to the dynamism of the modern market economy and to individual's 
responsibility and actions in providing means for one's life. So, the increased 
entrepreneurial inclinations in Serbia at the end of nineties could be treated as a 
positive trend. However, the proportion  (40% in 1999) of those who rejected the idea 
of being entrepreneurs should not be forgotten.  This is a warning that people still 
think of secure employment, to which they were habituated in the pre-transition 
“socialist” times, as a proper way in meeting their existential needs.  
As is shown in the Table 8, among the potential entrepreneurs in 1999  66% of 
them were also potential emigrants (those thinking to go abroad in the near future). 
 
Table 5.   Potential Emigrants*, Serbia, 1994. -1999. 
 
Segments 1994  1999 
Age 21-30 (%)  68  46 
Higher education (%)  34  49 22 
Potential entrepreneurs (%)  43  66 
  __________________________________________________________ 
Sources: Surveys of ISFF  in 1994 and 1999, organized by this author. *Potential emigrants 
were those who answered  that they “think to go abroad  for long”.   
The proportion of potential emigrants among persons with higher education 
and especially among those with entrepreneurial inclination has considerable 
increased by the end of nineties
18. This indicates the continuing aggravation of the 
employment possibilities for educated people in Serbia, caused by the persistent 
reduction of all economic activities in Serbia in that period. It also reflects the 
unsupportive social environment for private entrepreneurship under the actual 
conditions of the suppressed transition, voluntaristic changes in the ownership 
relations, and under the long-standing aversion toward entrepreneurs in this country. 
In the starting years of transition in Serbia (1990-1991) the most often 
mentioned "big entrepreneurs" (glorified by media) turned quickly to be "crooks" 
whose abilities in making money were not in business innovations but in making false 
promises (in the form of promised very high interest rates per month on deposited 
money in their "banks", saving agencies, sales companies, etc)
19. It was not a surprise 
that public perceptions of new entrepreneurs in the early nineties were often 
negatively pictured. Yet, in spite of such unsupportive social perceptions at the 
beginning of the transition period, entrepreneurial inclinations continued to increase 
Majority of impoverished Serbian population
20 may still envy all those who have had 
dissent living in those years of collapsing of the Serbian economy, including here 
entrepreneurs whose living conditions were, in average, better than of the rest of 
population. One could assume that ordinary people perceived many of advantages of 
private entrepreneurship for the society's well being. They understood that the over-all 
poverty in Serbia in these "lean years" would have been more severe if there were no 
private entrepreneurs. 
Individuals with entrepreneurial inclinations, after observing the "Serbian 
realities" have not abandoned their entrepreneurial "dreams". But,  many of them were 
thinking and dreaming to emigrate with hopes to have better chances for work and life 
"somewhere away of Serbia". This form of dissatisfaction of entrepreneurs, actual and 
                                                 
18 See the data on “potential emigrants” in S. Bolcic, 1995: 94-104.  
19 Some observations, based on the analyses of the press, are given in Bolcic, S.,1994: 134. 
20 According to  A. Posarac (1995) findings, the percent of empoverished population (those below the "poverty 
line" in Serbia grew from 6.2% in 1990. up to 35.6% in 1994 (p.338). 23 
potential, with the present situation could have lead not only to real emigration, but 
also to some increased social pressures for more radical changes in Serbia which 
would meet interests of all social strata, including the interests of entrepreneurs. So, 
entrepreneurship (actual and potential) seems to have generated positive social 
pressures and has lead toward transformation of Serbia even under the condition of 
the suppressed transition and in a relatively unsupportive socio-cultural "climate". 
 
  On the Impact and Prospects of Entrepreneurship in Serbia 
 
Private entrepreneurs in Serbia since 1989 established in some 65% of cases 
their firms in the trade business (wholesale and retail trade), preventing the dramatic 
decrease of the population's consumption which would have followed the steep fall of 
the domestic production since 1990.  
From the official statistics (SGJ 2001) one finds that in 1990. -1999. total 
turnover in trade (in constant 1994 prices) has dropped less than was the drop of the 
GDP in the same period. So, while the turnover in the retail trade in 1999. was 65% of 
the 1990 turnover, GDP in 1999. was 44% of the GDP in 1990? 
Thanks to thousands of private entrepreneurs, in spite of international 
sanctions since 1992, some import - export activities continued to exist and people in 
Serbia in the years of collapsing of their economy were still able to buy thousands of 
"necessities" ( like toilet paper, detergents, parts for their cars, appliances...) and that 
made their life less miserable. Data in the Table 9. illustrate this increasing role of the 
entrepreneurship in the private trade since 1990. 
 
Table 6.  The Growth of the Private Trade, Yugoslavia*, 1990.-1999. 
 1990  1992  1994  1999** 
Total turnover in retail trade 
(000 din)*** 
7.957 5.130  5131  8507 
Turnover in private retail 
trade (000 din) 
1.084 2.268  4.086  4.364 
% of private in total r. trade  14  44  80    51 
Employed persons in total 
retail trade   
107.316 122.937  140.258  100.567 24 
Employed in private retail 
trade 
13.434 33.360  77.165  83.414 
% of private in total empl.  13  27  55  83 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Source: SGJ-1998   * Available data for Yugoslavia describe well the 
situation of Serbia, also. ** Without data for Kosovo. *** Turnover is given in millions of 
1994. Yugoslav Dinars and in  1994 constant prices. 
 
Turnover in the private retail trade firms grew rapidly and in 1999 it was   
some 51% of the total turnover in the retail trade. In 1994 the percentage of turnover 
of private retail trade was even 80%, reflecting total collapse  o retail trade in “social” 
trading firms in the previous period of hyperinflation. Private retail trade firms were 
also employing an increasing proportion of the total employment in the retail trade 
(55% in 1994 and 83% in 1999), contributing to the alleviation of the increasing 
unemployment in this country in the given period. One could speculate
21 about the 
possible increases in private employment if in other fields of private business there 
were equal conditions for the increase of business activities, especially in productive 
branches, as was the case in the retail trade business.  
This data on this de facto privatization of retail trade branch of the Serbian 
economy under condition of still lacking privatization of major retail trade firms in 
social (“public”) ownership is one of proofs for the thesis of this paper that in spite of 
blocked transition some post-socialist transformations in Serbia has been taking place 
in the nineties. 
From the long-term perspective the learning of another way of life, less 
depended on state's concerns, might be the most beneficial consequence of the spread 
of entrepreneurship in Serbia in the nineties. This was a learning of new obligations 
and rights for those who have employed themselves by establishing private firm and a 
learning for ordinary people also. They became customers of such private firms, now 
existing and doing business in practically all branches (not just in farming, handicraft 
and some services, like in the pre-transition period). It was learning  for those in 
power since their power has diminished under the conditions of growing private 
entrepreneurship. 
                                                 
21 Unfortunately, official statistics is not providing similar data for other branches as those for the retail 
trade branch. 25 
Entrepreneurs were growing in numbers and as economic actors under the 
conditions not favourable for entrepreneurship, and that was so thanks to their 
readiness to use their personal and family capital (including, of course, also their 
"social capital") for private business under quite risky conditions for any business; 
Strangely enough, while the actual regime did little for the spread of 
entrepreneurship in Serbia, entrepreneurs indirectly  helped  in some degree the 
regime's survival, particularly by lessening the pauperisation of the most of Serbian 
population and by the postponing of the uncontrollable social unrest of generally 
greatly dissatisfied people.   
  
Lessons from Serbian "developments" in the nineties 
 
It has been usual in the recent years to forget and ignore Serbia in reviews of 
transition processes in East-Central Europe. Yet, it is unwise to forget Serbia when 
analysing post-socialist transformations in East-Central Europe. Serbia is an 
interesting case of social transformation in spite of the suppressed and greatly 
blocked transition, as was partly documented in this paper. There are several lessons 
to be considered from Serbian "developments" in the nineties: 
1. The transformation forces and actors in post-socialist societies are various 
and of particular importance in that respect are entrepreneurs
22 
2. The very reappearance of entrepreneurs and of the  owner's strata in Serbia 
should be considered as a change event of a deep and positive impact on the given 
society. 
3.  Entrepreneurs have been an expansive social actor , with a great self-
generating developmental power, whose presence and activity enlarged social space 
of free actions of others in the society as a whole, even under very unfavourable social 
conditions. 
4. The prerequisites for the reappearance and expansion of entrepreneurs 
seem to be relatively simple : the legalisation of the free formation of enterprises 
(firms), irrespectively of their legal ownership status, and restitution of  full 
                                                 
22 Entrepreneurs are individuals and other social actors performing entrepreneurial role ( introducing and realizing 
business innovations, taking risky decisions and providing strategic changes in the business life). They are not 
necessary owners of firms, but they are key actors in forming and directing firms. This firms where entrepreneurs 
will be found are not only "small firms", but also large companies, in various ownership status. In author's 
investigations of entrepreneurs in Serbia, operationally, entrepreneurs were owners and managers of non-state 
firms.  26 
management prerogatives of founders of firms.
23 All other institutional and real social, 
economic, political, cultural and other circumstances related to the spread of 
entrepreneurship are important but not decisive when those basic prerequisites for the 
reappearance are being met. 
5. The positive impact of entrepreneurs is not only in generating systemic 
transformations but also in the every day real-life transformations. Entrepreneurs 
prevented more serious aggravations of the living conditions of people in Serbia as 
well as in other post-socialist societies, caused by the "implosion" of their former 
socio-economic systems. In Serbia because of all its social disruptions, without 
thousands of (mostly small) entrepreneurs, the severity of pauperisation would have 
been insupportable. 
6. The long-term impact of entrepreneurs as strata on the social 
transformations of the post-socialist societies should not be judged solely on their 
actual still limited economic and political power and on some of their actual 
"personality" characteristics. They are in principle an expansive social actor, 
introducing new rules and patterns of behaviour (individual initiativeness, risk-
taking, individual responsibility for one's well-being, generating wealth based on 
one's work and successfulness in business life ), which are congruent with the  needs 
and interests of most members of modern societies. By transforming former "socialist" 
society in direction of an "entrepreneurial society" entrepreneurs are acting as 
promoters of a modern open society where all individuals have real opportunities to 
use fully their abilities for their benefits. This trend toward an "entrepreneurial 
society" existed, though feeble, even in Serbia in the nineties, in spite of its 
suppressed transition.   
 
____________ 
 
REFERENCES: 
Bolcic, S.  1992.  Cultural Dimension of Entrepreneurship - Some  
      Empirical Findings for the Yugoslav Region, 
   Ekonomska analiza, No.2. 
 
                                                 
23 These prerequisites for the spread of entrepreneurship in Serbia were provided already in the 1988-
1989 “reform laws” of the Ante Markovic government. 27 
Bolcic, S.  1994,  Tegobe prelaza u preduzetnicko drustvo (Hardship of  
      Transition toward the Entrepreneurial Society), 
   B e l g r a d e  
Bolcic, S.  1995,  Drustvene promene i svakodnevni zivot: Srbija 
   pocetkom  devedesetih (Social Changes and Everyday 
      Life: Serbia in the Early Nineties), Belgrade 
Bolcic, S.  1995a, The Features of a "Nationalised Society", Sociologija, 
   No. 4., Belgrade 
Bolcic, S.  1995b, The Meaning of the Social System and the Initial  
    Achievements of the 'Post-Socialist' Transition, 
   Balkan Forum, No.3, Skopje 
Bolcic, S.  1997,  Ownership Transformation and Problems of Redistri- 
    bution of the Social Power in the Post-Socialist  
   Societies,  Balkan Forum, No.2, Skopje 
Bolcic, S.        1997a, Osobenosti kulture interesnog delovanja u Srbiji 
devedesetih (Peculiarities of the Culture of the Interest 
Acting in Serbia in the Nineties ), in : M. Vasovic, ed., 
Fragmenti politicke kulture, Beograd 
Bolcic, S.   1998,  Entrepreneurial Inclinations and New Entrepreneurs in 
    Serbia in the Early Nineties, International Journal of 
   Sociology, No. 4 
Bolcic, S. ed.    2002, Srbija krajem mileniuma: razaranje drustva,   
                                       promene i svakodnevni zivot (Serbia at the End of 
                                     Millennium: Social Destruction, Changes and Every 
                                    Day Life), Beograd  
Bozovic, G.   1992,  Siva ekonomija u Jugoslaviji (Hidden Economy in  
   Yugoslavia),  Belgrade 
DeBono,         1986, Tactics: The Art and Science of Success, Fountana Books,     
London 
Goati, V., ed.  1995,  Challenges of Parliamentarism: the Case of Serbia 
    in the Early Nineties, Belgrade 
Goati, V.  1999,  Izbori u SR Jugoslaviji od 1990 do 1998. (Elections in  
    FR Yugoslavia from 1990. until 1998.), Belgrade 
Golubovic, Z.,  28 
all, 1995,  Drustveni karakter i drustvene promene u svetlu 
   nacionalnih  sukoba (Social Character and Social  
    Changes in the Light of Ethnic Conflicts), Belgrade 
Kanjuo-Mrcela, A.  1994,  Sindikati  i  privatizacija  (Trade  Unions  and    
Privatization),  Druzboslovne rasprave, No.17-18, 
Ljubljana 
Kostic, M.  1994,  Uspon Beograda (The Rise of Belgrade), Belgrade 
Lazic, M., all,  1994,   Society in Crisis, Beograd  
Lazic, M.  1996,  Economic Elites in Yugoslavia at the Beginning of 
    the Nineties, in Lengyel, G., ed.,Transformation of the 
    East-European Economic Elites, Budapest 
Lengyel, G.  1994,  A Social Consequences of Transformation: Entrepre- 
    neurial Inclinations in Hungary 1988-1993, Budapest 
Lim, N.  1995,  Who Has Gotten Ahead After the Fall of Communism?, 
   Czech Sociological Review, III. No.2, Praha 
Mateju, P. ,N. Lim, 1995, Who has gotten ahead after the fall of Communism? 
The case of Czech Republic, Czech Sociological Review. Vol. 3 
Minjevic, Djukan, ed., 1999, Zlatni krug 98 (The Golden Circle 98), Beokom, 
Beograd  
Mintzberg, Henry, 1979, The Structuring of Organizations, Prentice-Hall, N.J. 
Pavlovic, V., ed. 1995,Potisnuto civilno drustvo (Suppressed Civil Society), 
   Belgrade 
Podunavac, M. 1998,  Politicka kultura i politicke ustanove (Political Culture  
    and Political Institutions) in, Vasovic, M., Ed.  
    Fragmenti politicke kulture, Belgrade 
Popovic, P.  1995,  Preduzetnistvo: granice rasta (Entrepreneurship: The 
    Limits of Growth), Belgrade 
Posarac, A.  1995,  Pauperizacija stanovnistva Srbije - jedan od osnovnih 
    uzroka potisnutosti cicilnog drustva (Pauperization of  
    the Population of Serbia- one of the main reasons of the 
    suppressed civil society), in Pavlovic, V., ed.,Potisnuto 
   civilno  drustvo, Belgrade 
Rona-Tas, A., 
Lengyel, G.  1997,  Entrepreneurs and Entrepreneurial Inclinations in Post- 29 
   Communist  East-Central  Europe,  International Journal 
   of  Sociology, No.3 
Sekelj, L.  1995,  Yugoslavia - Change Without Transformation, 
   Sociologija, No.4, Belgrade 
Sekelj, L.  1998,  Three Patterns of Elite Transformation in Eastern  
   Europe,  Sociologija, No. 4, Belgrade 
SGJ-1995 1995,  Statistical Yearbook of Yugoslavia for 1995, Belgrade 
SGJ-1998 1998,  Statistical Yearbook of Yugoslavia for 1998, Belgrade 
SGJ-2001         2001, Statistical Yearbook of Yugoslavia for 2001, Belgrade 
            Slavujevic, Z.   1997, Kriza poverenja u institucije sistema  
( The Crisis of Confidence in system’s institutions), in :                        
S. Mihajlovic, ed., Izmedju osporavanja i podrske, 
 Beograd 
Vojin, A.  1995,   Tendencije deprofesionalizacije u uslovima privatnog 
   preduzetnistva ( Trends of Deprofesionalization under 
    Private Entrepreneurship), Diploma thesis, Faculty 
    of Philosophy, Belgrade 
Vukovic, S.   1996, Cemu privatizacija (Why Privatization?), Beograd 
Zec, M., all,  1994,  Privatizacija (Privatization), Beograd 
Zec, M., 
Zivkovic,B. 1997,  Tranzicija (Transition), Beograd 
Zolak, T., Zolak, V., Kako smo uspjeli?, Budva 
 
 
    
 
DAVIDSON INSTITUTE WORKING PAPER SERIES - Most Recent Papers 
The entire Working Paper Series may be downloaded free of charge at: www.wdi.bus.umich.edu 
 
CURRENT AS OF 10/31/03 
Publication Authors  Date 
No. 626: Blocked Transition And Post-Socialist Transformation: Serbia 
in the Nineties 
Silvano Bolcic   Oct. 2003 
No. 625: Generalizing the Causal Effect of Fertility on Female Labor 
Supply 
Guillermo Cruces and Sebastian 
Galiani 
Oct. 2003 
No. 624: The Allocation and Monitoring Role of Capital Markets: 
Theory and International Evidence 
Solomon Tadesse  Oct. 2003 
No. 623: Firm-Specific Variation and Openness in Emerging Markets  Kan Li, Randall Morck, Fan Yang 
and Bernard Yeung 
Oct. 2003 
No. 622: Exchange Rate Regimes and Volatility: Comparison of the 
Snake and Visegrad 
Juraj Valachy and Evžen 
Kočenda 
Oct. 2003 
No. 621: Do Market Pressures Induce Economic Efficiency?: The Case 
of Slovenian Manufacturing, 1994-2001 
Peter F. Orazem  and Milan 
Vodopivec 
Oct. 2003 
No. 620: Compensating Differentials in Emerging Labor and Housing 
Markets: Estimates of Quality of Life in Russian Cities 
Mark C. Berger, Glenn C. 
Blomquist and Klara Sabirianova 
Peter 
Oct. 2003 
No. 619: Are Foreign Banks Bad for Development Even If They Are 
Efficient? Evidence from the Indian Banking Sector 
Sumon Bhaumik and Jenifer 
Piesse 
Oct. 2003 
No. 618: The Echo of Job Displacement  Marcus Eliason and Donald 
Storrie 
Oct. 2003 
No. 617: Deposit Insurance During Accession EU Accession  Nikolay Nenovsky and Kalina 
Dimitrova 
Oct. 2003 
No. 616: Skill-Biased Transition: The Role of Markets, Institutions, and 
Technological Change 
Klara Sabirianova Peter  Oct. 2003 
No. 615: Initial Conditions, Institutional Dynamics and Economic 
Performance: Evidence from the American States 
Daniel Berkowitz and Karen Clay  Sept. 2003 
No. 614: Labor Market Dynamics and Wage Losses of Displaced  
Workers in France and the United States  
Arnaud Lefranc  Sept. 2003 
No. 613: Firm Size Distribution and EPL in Italy  Fabiano Schivardi and Roberto 
Torrini 
Sept. 2003 
No. 612: The Effect of Employee Involvment on Firm Performance: 
Evidence from an Econometric Case Study 
Derek C. Jones and Takao Kato  Sept. 2003 
No. 611: Working Inflow, Outflow, and Churning  Pekka Ilmakunnas and Mika 
Maliranta  
Sept. 2003 
No. 610: Signaling in The Labor Market: New Evidence On Layoffs, 
and Plant Closings 
Nuria Rodriguez-Planas  Sept. 2003 
No. 609: Job Flows and Establishment Characteristics: Variations 
Across U.S. Metropolitan Areas 
R. Jason Faberman  Sept. 2003 
No. 608: Dowry and Intrahousehold Bargaining: Evidence from China  Philip H. Brown  Sept. 2003 
No. 607: Policy Regime Change and Corporate Credit in Bulgaria: 
Asymmetric Supply and Demand Responses 
Rumen Dobrinsky and Nikola 
Markov 
Sept. 2003 
No. 606: Corporate Performance and Market Structure During 
Transition in Hungary 
László Halpern and Gábor Kõrösi  Aug. 2003 
No. 605: Culture Rules: The Foundations of the Rule of Law and Other 
Norms of Governance 
Amir N. Licht, Chanan 
Goldschmidt, and Shalom H. 
Schwartz 
Aug. 2003 
No. 604: Institutional Subversion: Evidence from Russian Regions  Irina Slinko, Evgeny Yakovlev, 
and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya 
Aug. 2003 
No. 603: The Effects of Privitzation and International Competitive 
Pressure on Firms’ Price-Cost Margins: Micro Evidence from Emerging 
Economics 
Jozef Konings, Patrick Van 
Cayseele and Frederic Warzynski 
Aug. 2003 
No. 602: The Usefulness of Corruptible Elections  Loren Brandt and Matthew 
Turner 
Aug. 2003 
 